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Abstract
Some of the most promising work in the area of
enforcing secure information  ow in programs is
based on static analyses of source code However
as yet these eorts have not had much impact in
practice We present a new approach to analyz
ing programs statically for secrecy and integrity
 ow violations The analysis is characterized as a
form of type inference in a secure  ow type sys
tem The type system provides a uniform frame
work for traditional type checking of programs and
information  ow control Typecorrect programs
have principal types that characterize how they
can be called securely Applications of the type
system include  ow analysis of legacy code as well
as code written in newlyemerging Web languages
like Javatm
Keywords secure information  ow certication
type systems Web programming
  Introduction
Secure information  ow within systems having
multiple sensitivity levels has long been a widely
recognized problem The classical problem is that
y
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of a multilevel subject one with a range of security
classes executing code that either accidentally or
maliciously leaks or corrupts sensitive data Leak
ing such data is a violation of secrecy while its
corruption is a violation of integrity 	
  Early
work in the area was motivated by the need to
securely handle information classied at dierent
levels within the government the military in par
ticular But the problem is now also apparent
within the context of Internet programming and
newlyemerging Web programming languages like
Java 	
With Java programs called Java appletstm
can be downloaded from the Internet and executed
with user privileges by a Javacompatible Web
browser like HotJavatm or Netscape Navigator
 There are obvious secrecy and integrity prob
lems here For instance a downloaded applet may
attempt to make the contents of a users private
les such as mailfolders or log les public by mail
ing them to remote sites Currently users have
the option as in HotJava to forbid downloaded
code from accessing any local les This is called
the Applet Host mode In fact this is the only
security mode available in the Netscape Naviga
tor beta release But such steps will undoubtedly
prove to be too impractical Useful applets like
mail and other transaction tools will need access
to private les in order to perform their tasks
This is where the static analysis of code for se
cure information  ow can provide a ner level of
security in terms of secrecy as well as integrity
For instance it can allow access to private les

yet guarantee that their contents are not stored
in public places We begin by examining some of
these analyses in the next section Unfortunately
they have had little impact in practice In Sec
tion  we propose an alternative form of static
analysis based on a powerful yet very practical
notion called type inference
 Information Flow Control
Strategies
Secure information  ow within systems was stud
ied years ago by Bell and LaPadula 	  This was
followed by the work of Denning who presented a
lattice model of secure information  ow certica
tion and gave an algorithm for analyzing programs
for secure implicit and explicit  ows 	   Den
ning provided an informal treatment of the sound
ness of secure  ow certication A more formal
treatment of its soundness was given by Mizuno
and Schmidt 	 which is discussed in 	

Andrews and Reitman 	 in a related eort
proposed extending a traditional axiomatic logic
for program correctness with secure  ow certica
tion Their emphasis was on a formal specica
tion of certication in a programming logic They
did not consider any practical algorithms for their
extended logic nor was soundness of the logic ad
dressed These are major drawbacks of their work
The more recent work of Banatre Bryce and Le
Metayer 	 is based on statically detecting  ow vi
olations from an accessibility graph constructed for
a program These graphs record information  ows
among variables at certain program points This
work and secure  ow certication are discussed in
more detail in the next two sections
  Dennings Secure Flow Certi
cation
In the lattice model of secure  ow certication
a  ow policy is represented by a poset   S 
where S is a set of security classes and   is a
partial order called the  ow relation specifying
permissible  ows between classes Every variable
x is assigned a security class denoted by x and it
is assumed that x is static and can be determined
from class declarations given in a program If x
and y are variables and there is a  ow of informa
tion from x to y then it is a permissible  ow i
x  y
Every programming construct has a certication
rule Some rules certify explicit  ows while others
certify implicit  ows For example an assignment
statement y  x is certied i x  y that is the
 ow of information from the security class of x to
that of y is prescribed by the  ow relation This
is an example of certifying an explicit  ow The
rules for conditional constructs such as if state
ments and while loops certify implicit  ows For
example the conditional statement
if x   then y   else z  
is certied i x  y and x  z
If the poset   S  is a lattice so that for
any pair of classes there are unique upper and
lower bound classes then a simple attribute gram
mar can be given to certify programs It con
sists only of synthesized attributes which are se
curity classes computed using least upper bound
 and greatest lower bound  operators 	
For instance the certication condition for the if
statement above would become the single condi
tion x  y  z
  Limitations of Certication
One drawback of Dennings  ow certication is
that it requires security classes of variables to be
known at certication time So it is unsuitable for
analyzing legacy code unless the code is prepro
cessed to include appropriate security class decla
rations for all program objects
Another perhaps more serious practical draw
back is its treatment of procedures Procedure
calls in  ow certication have the form
call q a
 




     b
n

where the actual input parameters are a
 
     a
m
and the actual output parameters are b
 
     b
n

If procedure q has formal input parame
ters x
 
     x
m
and formal output parameters

y 
     y
n
 then the security of the call requires
that three conditions be veried










for j       n
Conditions b and c certify  ow into and out
of the procedure respectively Notice that q can
output results of a higher class than the inputs
For example suppose S consists of security classes
L low and H high with L  H and consider
procedure copy in x  int L out y  int H
y  x
end
Procedure copy copies its input x declared with
security class L to its output y of class H
We can imagine erasing the class declarations
from the procedure so that it could be called to
copy fromH to H or from L to L giving us a form
of polymorphism with respect to classes To certify
calls of procedures that are generic with respect to
security classes Denning proposes replacing con









     b
n
under the assumptions that
 procedure qs output parameters are derived
solely from the input parameters and informa
tion in a least class
 any local variables of q are erased upon return
and
 q does not write into any nonlocal objects
Notice that b
 
 unlike b and c does not men
tion the formal parameters of q only the actual
parameters of a call Thus dierent calls to q can
induce dierent instances of b
 
 so polymorphism
is achieved but at a very high cost Assumptions
 are too restrictive in practice Useful proce
dures like a monitor for controlling access to a
shared buer are prohibited Also compilers nor
mallymake no attempt to erase the value of a local
variable on the stack Besides these assumptions
still have to be veried before b
 
 can be used
which is clearly outside the realm of certication
Mizuno proposed a more  exible strategy for
certifying recursive procedures in the style of Den
ning 	 It involves generating  ow constraints
for a program by computing the least xed point
of a set of symbolic  ow equations The equations
are constructed according to Dennings certica
tion rules The strategy though is limited to pro
cedures whose arguments are passed by value or
by result
   Banatre et als Information
Flow Detection
Banatre Bryce and Le Metayer give a compile
time algorithm for detecting information  ow in
sequential programs whereby variables need not be
annotated with security classes 	 What makes
their work appealing is that the algorithm is de
rived through a sequence of steps from an initial
axiomatic information ow logic The result is
an inference system whose rules are used to trans
form information  ow graphs called accessibility
graphs The result of applying these transforma
tions to an initial graph for a given program is
a nal accessibility graph indicating whether the
contents of one variable at some point in the pro
gram can  ow into an instance of a variable at
some other point The drawback here is that the
number of vertices in the nal accessibility graph is
at least linear in the size of the programs abstract
syntax tree This means that nal graphs are ex
tremely sensitive to program size as we shall see in
Section  Thus they are unsuitable as specica
tions of the secure  ow properties of programs
 Secure Flow Typing
Type systems have been used to capture a variety
of dierent kinds of program analyses A type sys
tem is basically a set of inference rules with which
one infers various properties of programs Secure
information  ow is a program property so we can
characterize it as a type correctness issue

The secure  ow type system overcomes the lim
itations of  ow certication mentioned above and
does not require calculation of least xed points as
in Mizunos approach It is a uniform framework
for traditional type checking in programming lan
guages and secure  ow enforcement That is the
issue of secure  ows is no longer orthogonal to the
more traditional type correctness issue of whether
a program is well formed Further standard type
inference techniques can be used to automate se
cure  ow analysis in a way that makes it more
practical
In the secure  ow type system security classes
are basic types which we denote here by   and
the typing rules enforce secure information  ow
For example consider the typing rule for an as
signment statement x  e
  x   acc   e  
  x  e   cmd

In order for the assignment to be well typed it
must be that
 x is a variable of type  acceptor meaning
x is capable of storing information at security
level   and
 expression e has type security class  
Information about x is provided by  which maps
identiers to types So the rule states that in order
for the assignment x  e to be judged secure x
must be a variable that stores information at the
same security level as e If this is true then the
rule allows us to ascribe type  cmd to the entire
assignment statement In general a statement has
type  cmd only if every variable assigned to in
the statement is capable of storing information at
security level  or higher Note that Dennings  ow
certication would not be concerned with whether
x of x  e is a variable or a constant But this is
not true of rule  which addresses the issue of
well formedness as well as secure  ow
Another novel aspect of the type system is its
use of subtyping A  ow policy   S  naturally
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 








Notice that typing rule  requires x and e to
have the same security level This might appear
too restrictive for the rule prevents an upward  ow
from e to x say for example if x were high and e
low This is where subtyping comes into play It
allows us to coerce the type of e from low to high
to get agreement A detailed formal treatment of
all typing rules and the subtyping logic is outside
the scope of this paper and can be found instead
in 	

 Polymorphism and Type Infer
ence
A major advantage of the secure  ow type system
is that it can be implemented using powerful type
inference techniques A type inference algorithm
not only proves whether a procedure is typable or
free of illegal  ows but it also produces a principal
type which characterizes how the procedure can be
called securely
A principal type usually comprises a set of sub





 Subtype constraints may be generic
and involve type variables that range over all secu
rity classes These variables can be specialized in
many dierent ways depending on the procedures
calling context A context will require them to be
specialized in a certain way As long as the spe
cialization satises the constraints the procedure
can be executed without causing any illegal  ows
So a procedure is eectively parameterized on the
security classes of its formal parameters In this
sense it is polymorphic
For example consider the procedure




It has the inferred principal type
  with      proc  acc
where  and  are type variables such that  cor
responds to the security class of x and  to the

security class of y The principal type succintly
conveys how the procedure can be securely called
Any call can be executed securely providing the
arguments of the call have security classes that
when substituted for the bound variables  and 
of the type satisfy the constraint    The call
itself will have type  cmd  For instance copy has
type L procLL acc and therefore can be called
to copy from low to low with the call itself being
regarded as a low command of type L cmd  It also
has type H procLH acc so it can be called to
copy from low to high But it cannot be called to
copy from high to low because H  L
Notice that in a call to copy type variables 










is satised The constraint in





is precisely condition b
 
 However in the secure
 ow type system the constraint is inferred auto
matically as a consequence of typing the assign
ment y  x by rule  Dennings approach to
polymorphism eectively limits all typings of pro
cedures to at most one subtype constraint namely
the constraint corresponding to  ow condition b
 

This greatly limits the kind of polymorphic proce
dures one can write In general a procedure can
induce multiple subtype constraints depending on
its denition
It might appear that the number of subtype con
straints in a principal type would grow too quickly
in the size of the program to be useful in prac
tice After all there are programs in the context
of traditional subtyping that require the number of
constraints in their principal types to grow at least
linearly in program size 	 Obviously the utility
of a type inference algorithm that produces prin
cipal types with this many constraints is severely
limited However our experience has been that
this kind of growth is not an issue for secure  ow
typing in practice An inferred principal type for
a program is typically much smaller than the pro
gram itself due to type simplication 	 Princi
pal types are relatively insensitive to program size
For instance consider a new version of proce
dure copy  The original version has an explicit
 ow from x to y Suppose we accomplish the same
x0 a0 b0
a2 a4 b4 b8




Figure  Accessibility graph for new copy
eect through an implicit  ow instead This can
be achieved as follows
procedure copyin x  int  out y  int
var a  x
var b  
begin
while a   do
a  a	 




The new version has the same inferred principal
type as the original version even though its deni
tion is quite dierent
Contrast this insensitivity with that of calculat
ing an accessibility graph for the program as de
scribed in 	 The graph calculated for the original
version of copy has only the single edge x y
conveying there is a  ow from x at entry point
p

to y at point p
 
 These program points arise
from the procedure body expressed with explicit
program points as in p
 
 y  x there is also a
distinguished point p

 which represents the entry
point of the procedure
Now compare this simple graph with the graph
in Figure  which is obtained from the new version
of copy  The new graph is constructed from copy
with explicit program points introduced as follows


procedure copyin x  int  out y  int
var a















 a  a	 
p






 y  b


The constructed graph has grown in size propor
tional to the number of program points there are
now  such points Notice that there is a path
from x to y conrming the implicit  ow from x
at point p

to y at point p

in the program How
ever the graph does not tell us how copy can be
called securely only that there is a  ow from x to
y For these reasons accessibility graphs are un
suitable as userlevel specications of a procedures
information  ow properties Moreover one can see
that the focus of this approach is on identifying
 ows among instances of program variables This
leads to other problems that do not arise with se
cure  ow typing For example pointers and alias
ing of locations complicate graph construction re
quiring some form of pointer aliasing analysis
As a nal example consider the library decryp
tion procedure in Figure  taken from 	 The
encrypted character array cipher is decrypted us
ing key and stored in clear  We assume that the
decryption is done by D and that the cost of doing
the decryption is stored in variable charge
The principal type inferred for decrypt is
    
with         
 proc  arr   arr   var
The type has three subtype constraints that gov
ern how decrypt can be used securely Any call of
the procedure can be executed securely provided
the arguments of the call have security classes that
satisfy all the constraints The call itself will have
type  cmd  For instance the substitution
  L   H     L
procedure decryptin key  int 
inout cipher  clear  array of char 
inout charge  int
var i  
var unit  unit rate constant
begin
charge  unit 
while cipher 	i   do
if encrypted cipher 	i then
charge  charge   
 unit 
clear 	i  Dcipher 	i key
else
charge  charge  unit 
clear 	i  cipher 	i

i  i  
od
end
Figure  The library decryption procedure
satises the constraints so decrypt can be called
as a procedure with type
L procHL arr H arr L var
and the call will have type L cmd  The call cannot
however be typed as H cmd unless the argument
corresponding to charge is high
Another very useful facet of type inference in
this setting is its ability to reveal suspicious code
through changes in principal types For example
if we change the expression
charge  charge   
 unit 
in procedure decrypt to the expression
charge  charge  key   
 unit 
in an attempt to deduce the key from the output
charge then the principal type of decrypt becomes
   	  
with          	   	  
 proc	  arr   arr   var
Notice the two additional subtype constraints 	 
 and 	   The former says that the security

level of the clear array must be at least that of the
input key This constraint stems from the assign
ment to clear involving a call to the decryption
procedure D with the key as an argument It did
indeed arise for the original version of decrypt as
well but it was eliminated through type simpli
cation 	 was replaced by  giving    which
was deleted The latter constraint on the other
hand is new It says that the security level of the
charge parameter must be at least that of the in
put key So now any procedure call with a high
key will no longer be well typed unless the charge
parameter is also high Such a restriction would
likely be unacceptable but the point here is that
type inference clearly reveals it
 Discussion
As Denning pointed out the secure  ow problem
for a typical programming language is undecidable
	 Consequently any sound and recursive logic
for proving that programs have no secure  ow vi
olations is necessarily incomplete This is a com
mon tradeo for the soundness and decidability of
a logical system So like Dennings certication
the type system is incomplete This means that
the type system may rule out some secure pro
grams Although more experience is needed the
type system has been designed to reduce the num
ber of false positives 	

The utility of the type system rests on the
proper classication of information Sometimes an
algorithm will produce sensitive data from inputs
that are not considered sensitive Examples range
from functions that generate cryptographic keys
to signal processing algorithms designed to extract
target signatures from background noise Perhaps
neither the inputs nor the arithmetic operations
used in these algorithms would separately be con
sidered sensitive But they may be used to calcu
late sensitive data The type system will not detect
that such data are actually sensitive However the
algorithm can be packaged as a procedure whose
type can be asserted to re ect the dierent secu
rity levels of the inputs and outputs Then the
type system can ensure that it is called securely
We envision secure  ow typing being used
within Web browsers specically within Java
compatible browsers One approach being inves
tigated is to incorporate it into the Class Loader
for Java applets A Class Loader could perform
secure  ow typing on applet bytecodes and sub
sume the level of type checking currently done on
instructions of the virtual machine Such typing
would ensure secrecy and integrity of downloaded
Java applets In the case of integrity for instance
one can imagine nancial centers serving applets
to users that perform say nancial transactions
Some applet may need to make an entry into a 
nancial audit trail and the integrity of the audit
trail must be assured Secure  ow typing could
be used to certify that an applet does not corrupt
the audit trail with low integrity information of a
transaction
 Summary
Approaches to the static analysis of code for se
cure information  ow have had little impact in
practice so far This paper has described an al
ternative static analysis that we have argued is an
improvement over these other approaches Secure
 ow analysis is characterized as a type inference
problem Procedures that have no illegal  ows are
given principal types that convey how they can be
called securely in dierent contexts These types
can serve as specications for the secure  ow prop
erties of programs The role of secure  ow typ
ing in Web programming like that encouraged by
Java needs further investigation However it is
clear that such type inference can provide a ner
level of security for clients than is currently avail
able in certain Web browsers
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